
top row, left to right:
Ueli Maurer,
Martin Hirt,
Zuzana Beerliová
middle row, left ro right:
Divesh Aggarwal,
Peter Gazi,
Simon Knellwolf,
Christoph Lucas
bottom row, left to right:
Dominik Raub,
Björn Tackmann,
Stefano Tessaro,
Vassilis Zikas
Recent Research Highlights
- Generic equivalence of breaking RSA and factoring.
A long-standing open problem in cryptography is whether breaking the RSA
cryptosystem is as hard as factoring the modulus, or whether it is
potentially much easier. It is proved in [AM09] that
breaking RSA and factoring are equivalent in a generic model of
computation. Any generic algorithm for breaking RSA can be
transformed into a factoring algorithm.
- Efficient symmetric cryptography under very weak assumptions.
In contrast to the standard notion of a pseudo-random
function (PRF), which is indistinguishable from a random function for
a computationally-bounded adversary asking arbitrarily many queries
(within its running time constraint), the new notion of an s-query
weak PRF was introduced in
[MT08]. Such a
function need only be secure against an adversary who obtains a fixed
number s (e.g. s=2) of input-output pairs and, moreover, the inputs are random
(not chosen). It is shown that provably-secure encryption can be obtained
from an s-query weak PRF essentially as efficiently as from a full-fledged PRF.
- Quantum cryptography -- revisited.
Quantum cryptography has been advocated as being provably secure based
only that the laws of quantum mechanics are correct. It was shown in
[AKMR07]
that, contrary to the established security proofs in quantum
cryptography, there are provably-secure key agreement schemes which
can be broken. While a generated key is indeed provably secure,
its security is potentially lost when it is used.
This shows that the traditional security definition is
too weak. The flaw is due to a locking
property of the notion of accessible information in quantum physics:
one additional (physical) bit of information can increase the accessible
information by more than one bit. This problem was solved in
[Ren05]
where the right security definition for quantum key distribution is
stated and a new framework for proving the security is proposed.
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