Cryptographic Protocols

Solution to Exercise 5

5.1 Perfectly Binding/Hiding Commitments

We consider perfectly correct commitment schemes with a non-interactive COMMIT phase. Such a commitment scheme can be characterized by a function $C : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{R} \to \mathcal{B}$ that maps a value $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and a randomness string $r$ from some randomness space $\mathcal{R}$ to a blob $b = C(x, r)$ in some blob space $\mathcal{B}$. The OPEN phase simply consists of the prover’s sending $(x, r)$ to the verifier, who checks that $C(x, r) = b$.

In the following, denote by $B_x := \text{im}C(x, \cdot)$ for $x \in \mathcal{X}$.

a) Let $x \neq x'$. Perfectly binding means that $B_x \cap B_{x'} = \emptyset$, whereas perfectly hiding means that $C(x, R)$ and $C(x', R)$ are identically distributed random variables for $R \in \mathcal{R}$. This requires in particular that $B_x = B_{x'}$, which contradicts $B_x \cap B_{x'} = \emptyset$.

b) Subtasks b) and c) are discussed simultaneously in c).

c) Note that in all cases, the combined scheme is a string commitment $C(x, (r_1, r_2))$.

1. Hiding: The computational hiding property of $C_B$ cannot be broken by additionally adding the blob of the perfectly hiding scheme $C_H$.

   Binding: As $C_B$ is perfectly binding, this is also true for the combined scheme $(C_H(x, r_1), C_B(x, r_2))$, since $C(x, (r_1, r_2)) = C(x', (r'_1, r'_2))$ implies that $C_B(x, r_2) = C_B(x', r'_2)$.

2. Hiding: Clearly, the scheme is perfectly hiding as $C_H(C_B(x, r_1), r_2)$ perfectly hides $C_B(x, r_1)$ and thereby $x$.

   Binding: Assume for contradiction one could efficiently come up with $x \neq x'$, $(r_1, r_2)$, and $(r'_1, r'_2)$ such that $C(x, (r_1, r_2)) = C(x', (r'_1, r'_2))$. Then, by the fact that $C_B$ is perfectly binding, $y := C_B(x, r_1) \neq C_B(x', r'_1) =: y'$, one can efficiently come up with $y \neq y'$, $r_2$, and $r'_2$ such that $C_H(y, r_2) = C_H(y', r'_2)$, which breaks the (computational) binding property of $C_H$.

3. Hiding: Clearly, the scheme is perfectly hiding as $C_H(x, r_1)$ perfectly hides $x$.

   Binding: Assume for contradiction one could efficiently come up with $x \neq x'$, $(r_1, r_2)$, and $(r'_1, r'_2)$ such that $C(x, (r_1, r_2)) = C(x', (r'_1, r'_2))$. Then, by the fact that $C_B$ is perfectly binding, $y := C_H(x, r_1) = C_H(x', r'_1) =: y'$, one can efficiently come up with $x \neq x'$, $r_1$, and $r'_1$ such that $C_H(x, r_1) = y = C_H(x', r'_1)$, which breaks the (computational) binding property of $C_H$.

\footnote{Formally, this would have to be proved via a reduction.}
5.2 Graph Coloring

The protocol is a proof of statement, it shows that \( G \) has a 3-coloring. Let \( V = \{1, \ldots, n\} \), and the 3-coloring be defined as a function \( f : V \rightarrow \{1, 2, 3\} \).

**Peggy**

knows a 3-coloring \( f \) for

\[ G := (V, E) \]

choose a random permutation of the colors \( \pi \)

let \( f' = \pi \circ f \)

\[ \forall i \in V, \text{ commit to } f'(i) \text{ as } C_i \]

open colors of vertices \( i \) and \( j \)

\[ d_i, d_j \]

**Vic**

knows \( G \)

let \( (i, j) \in R E \)

check if \( f'(i), f'(j) \in \{1, 2, 3\} \) and \( f'(i) \neq f'(j) \)

Completeness: It is easily verified that if \( G \) has a 3-coloring, then Vic always accepts. Peggy can answer all the Vic’s queries correctly such that Vic is convinced as long as the commitment scheme is binding.

Soundness: The scheme has soundness \( \frac{1}{|E|} \): if \( G \) does not have a 3-coloring, a cheating prover must commit to a coloring that has at least one edge whose vertices have the same color, or to colors that are not in \( \{1, 2, 3\} \). Hence, with probability \( \frac{1}{|E|} \), the verifier catches him, assuming the commitments are perfectly binding. When doing \( n|E| \) sequential repetitions of the protocol, the soundness error is down to \( (1 - \frac{1}{|E|})^{n|E|} \leq e^{-n} \).

Zero-Knowledge: The protocol is \( c \)-simulatable: Given \((i, j)\), choose random colors \( \sigma_i, \sigma_j \), and compute the commitments \( C_i, C_j \). Since \(|E|\) is polynomially large the protocol is zero-knowledge., assuming that the commitments are perfectly hiding.

5.3 Homomorphic Commitments

Note that a blob committing to 0 is a quadratic residue, and, since \( t \) is a quadratic non-residue with \( \left( \frac{t}{m} \right) = +1 \), a blob committing to 1 is a quadratic non-residue \( b \) with \( \left( \frac{b}{m} \right) = +1 \). Thus, the scheme is of type \( B \), where the computational hiding property relies on the QR assumption, which states that modulo an RSA prime \( m \) it is hard to distinguish quadratic residues from quadratic non-residues with \( \left( \frac{b}{m} \right) = +1 \).

**a)** Denote by \( b_0 = r_0^2 t^{x_0} \) and \( b_1 = r_1^2 t^{x_1} \) two blobs to bits \( x_0 \) and \( x_1 \), respectively. By multiplying \( b_0 \) and \( b_1 \), one obtains

\[ b = b_0 \cdot b_1 = r_0^2 \cdot r_1^2 \cdot t^{x_0 + x_1}. \]

This is a commitment to \( x_0 \oplus x_1 \): If \( x_0 = x_1 \) (i.e., \( x_0 \oplus x_1 = 0 \)), then \( b \) is a quadratic residue (with square root \( r_0 r_1 \) if \( x_0 = x_1 = 0 \) and \( r_0 r_1 t \) if \( x_0 = x_1 = 1 \)). If \( x_0 \neq x_1 \) (i.e., \( x_0 \oplus x_1 = 1 \)), then \( b \) is a quadratic non-residue with \( \left( \frac{b}{m} \right) = +1 \).

**b)** Let \( b_0 = r_0^2 t^x \) be the blob to \( x \). By multiplying \( b_0 \) by \( t \) one obtains

\[ b_1 = b_0 \cdot t = r_0^2 \cdot t^{x+1}. \]

If \( x = 0 \), \( b_1 \) is a quadratic non-residue and thus a commitment to 1. If \( x = 1 \), \( b_1 \) is a quadratic residue and thus a commitment to 0.
c) As shown in a), if $x_0 = x_1$, $b_0 \cdot b_1$ is a quadratic residue, a fact that Peggy can prove using the Fiat-Shamir protocol. Moreover, if $x_0 \neq x_1$, then $b := b_0 \cdot b_1$ is a quadratic non-residue with $\left( \frac{b}{m} \right) = +1$ and thus $b_0 \cdot b_1 \cdot t$ is a quadratic residue, which, again, can be proved using the Fiat-Shamir protocol.

5.4 Sudoku

In the following we use a commitment scheme of Type B.

The following protocol is a possible solution for this task:

**Phase 1:** Peggy commits to every cell of the Sudoku solution. Peggy additionally commits for every row, column and subgrid, to the numbers $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ uniformly at random.

**Phase 2:** Vic chooses a challenge uniformly at random $c \in \mathbb{R}\{0, 1\}$.

**Phase 3:** If $c = 0$ Peggy opens all additional commitments (rows, columns, subgrids) and also the preprinted values of the Sudoku solution. Vic checks that in each additional row, column and subgrid the numbers from $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ appear, and also checks that the preprinted values of the Sudoku solution are consistent. And if $c = 1$, Peggy proves (using the ZK proof for equality) that the blobs between each row (resp. column, subgrid) in the Sudoku solution and the additionally committed row (resp. column, subgrid) are commitments to equal values.

**Completeness:** If Peggy knows the Sudoku solution, she can answer both challenges, so completeness follows directly.

**Proof of Knowledge:** The protocol is 2-extractable. Let the triples $(t, c, r), (t, c', r')$ be two triples of messages accepted by Vic with $0 = c \neq c' = 1$. Here the message $t$ is the set of blobs that Peggy commits to (the Sudoku solution and the additionally committed rows, columns and subgrids). From the first triple, we obtain $r$, the decommitment to open all preprinted values in the Sudoku solution and all additionally committed rows, columns and subgrids. From the second triple, we obtain $r'$, the zero knowledge equality proofs between the blobs corresponding to rows/columns/subgrids of the Sudoku solution and the additionally committed rows/columns/subgrids. Since the commitments are of type B, we can recover the original values of the Sudoku solution with overwhelming probability.

**Zero-Knowledge:** The simulator $S$ can produce a transcript as follows: First, $S$ commits to a fake Sudoku solution with valid preprinted values, and also for each row, column and subgrid, $S$ commits to the numbers $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ uniformly at random. If $V'$ sends the challenge $c = 0$, the simulator opens the preprinted values and the additionally committed rows, columns and subgrids. If $V'$ sends $c = 1$, $S$ uses the simulator $S'$ for the blob equality protocol to compute a transcript of the corresponding equality proofs. Note that, by the computational hiding property of the commitments, the transcript produced by $S'$ is computationally indistinguishable from the real interaction.