

# Cryptographic Protocols

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Part 9

## MPC as a Service



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## Adversary Structure

### Notation

- Party set  $\mathcal{P}$ ,  $|\mathcal{P}| = n$
- Monotone adversary structure  $\mathcal{Z} = \{Z_1, Z_2, \dots, Z_\ell\} \subseteq 2^{\mathcal{P}}$   
(Monotone:  $Z \in \mathcal{Z}$ ,  $Z' \subseteq Z \Rightarrow Z' \in \mathcal{Z}$ )

Adv. chooses one of them

### Definitions

- $Q^2(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{Z}) : \Leftrightarrow \forall Z_1, Z_2 \in \mathcal{Z} : Z_1 \cup Z_2 \neq \mathcal{P}$  (no two sets add up to  $\mathcal{P}$ )
- $Q^3(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{Z}) : \Leftrightarrow \forall Z_1, Z_2, Z_3 \in \mathcal{Z} : Z_1 \cup Z_2 \cup Z_3 \neq \mathcal{P}$   
(no three sets add up to  $\mathcal{P}$ )

### Results

	Threshold	Gen. Adv.
• i.t. passive:	$t < n/2$	$Q^2(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{Z})$ [HM97, Mau02]
• i.t. active:	$t < n/3$	$Q^3(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{Z})$ [HM97, Mau02]
• crypto. active:	$t < n/2$	$Q^2(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{Z})$ [HM97, Mau02]

## Sharing

$Z_1$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
$Z_2$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
$Z_3$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
$Z_4$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
$Z_5$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
:					
$Z_\ell$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red

## Addition / Linear Functions

$Z_1$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
$Z_2$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
$Z_3$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
$Z_4$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
$Z_5$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
:					
$Z_\ell$	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red

## Sharing State

$$\mathcal{Z} = \{Z_1, Z_2, \dots, Z_\ell\}$$

### Sharing State:

A value  $s$  is shared if:

- $s$  is split into random summands  $s_1, \dots, s_\ell$ , where  $\sum s_q = s$ .
- All parties in  $\overline{Z}_q$  know  $s_q$ .

A shared value is denoted by  $[s]$ .

### Linearity

- $[a + b] = [a] + [b]$  locally add up summands
- $[c \cdot a] = [c \cdot a]$

### Passive Protocol

#### Share Input

- $P_d$  has input  $a$ .
- $P_d$  selects random summands  $a_1, \dots, a_\ell$  s.t.  $\sum a_q = a$ .
- $P_d$  sends  $a_q$  to every  $P_i$  in  $\overline{Z}_q$

#### Reconstruct Output

- $a$  is shared by  $a_1, \dots, a_\ell$ .
- For all  $q$ : a fixed  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_q$  sends  $a_q$  to  $P_r$ .
- $P_r$  computes  $a = \sum a_q$ .

#### Addition

- $a, b$  shared by  $a_1, \dots, a_\ell, b_1, \dots, b_\ell$ .
- For all  $q$ : Every  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_q$  computes  $c_q = a_q + b_q$ .

#### Multiplication

- $a, b$  shared by  $a_1, \dots, a_\ell, b_1, \dots, b_\ell$ .
- For all  $p, q$ : A fixed  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_p \cap \overline{Z}_q$  computes and shares  $a_p b_q$ .
- Compute  $[c] = \sum \sum [a_p b_q]$ .

### Multiplication: Idea

**Goal:** Given  $[a], [b]$  compute  $[c] = [ab]$ .

**Observation:**

$$\begin{aligned} ab &= (a_1 + \dots + a_\ell)(b_1 + \dots + b_\ell) \\ &= a_1 b_1 + a_1 b_2 + \dots + a_\ell b_\ell = \sum_{p=1}^{\ell} \sum_{q=1}^{\ell} a_p b_q \end{aligned}$$

**Idea:** Its is enough to compute sharings of all  $a_p b_q$ :

$$[ab] = \sum_{p=1}^{\ell} \sum_{q=1}^{\ell} [a_p b_q]$$

**Observation:**

$$Q^2(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{Z}) \Leftrightarrow \forall p, q \ Z_p \cup Z_q \neq \mathcal{P} \Leftrightarrow \forall p, q \ \exists P_i \in \overline{Z}_p \cap \overline{Z}_q$$

### Active Sharing Protocol

**Goal:** Share input value  $s$  of party  $P_d$ .

**Share( $P_d, s$ )**

1.  $P_d$  selects random summands  $s_1 + \dots + s_\ell$  s.t.  $s = \sum s_q$
2. For all  $1 \leq q \leq \ell$  do:
  - a)  $P_d$  sends  $s_q$  to all parties in  $\overline{Z}_q$ .
  - b) The parties in  $\overline{Z}_q$  exchange the received values.  
If  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_q$  sees different values: complain using broadcast.
  - c) If any  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_q$  complained:  $P_d$  broadcasts  $s_q$ .  
Otherwise each  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_q$  takes the value received in step 2a) for  $s_q$ .

### Active Reconstruction

**Goal:** Reconstruct  $[s]$  towards  $P_r$ .

**Share-Reconstruction( $P_r, [s], q$ )**

1. Every party  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_q$  sends  $s_q$  to  $P_r$ .
2. Let  $v_i$  be the value  $P_r$  received from  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_q$ .  
 $P_r$  outputs  $v$  such that  $\{P_i \mid v_i \neq v\} \in \mathcal{Z}$ .

**Reconstruction( $P_r, [s]$ )**

1. For all  $q$  invoke  $s_q \leftarrow$  Share-Reconstruction( $P_r, [s], q$ ).
2.  $P_r$  outputs  $s = s_1 + \dots + s_\ell$ .

### Active Multiplication Protocol

**Goal:** Compute  $[c] = [ab]$

**Multiplication( $[a], [b]$ )**

1. For all  $1 \leq q, p \leq \ell$  do:
  - a) Every party  $P_i \in \overline{Z}_p \cap \overline{Z}_q$  shares  $a_p b_q$  as  $[v_{pq}^k]$ .
  - b) Let  $P_i$  be a fixed party in  $\overline{Z}_p \cap \overline{Z}_q$ .  
Compute and open  $[v_{pq}^i] - [v_{pq}^j]$  for all  $P_j \in \overline{Z}_p \cap \overline{Z}_q$ .
  - c) If all differences are zero: Set  $[v_{pq}] = [v_{pq}^1]$  as a sharing for  $a_p b_q$ .  
Otherwise, reconstruct  $a_p$  and  $b_q$  (using Share-Reconstruction).  
Define  $[v_{pq}]$  as the sharing with summands  $(a_p b_q, 0, \dots, 0)$ .
2. Compute  $[c] = \sum [v_{pq}]$ .